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A Bulletin reader named Ryan Alt argues in the comments to this roundtable that “it 
is very difficult to imagine [a nuclear weapon] ban [treaty] as anything more than 
wishful thinking.” Another reader, Keith B. Rosenberg, writes that one should 
“[n]ever make a treaty that will not be adhered to”—essentially, that the ban treaty 
is too idealistic to be feasible. 
I’ll argue the opposite—that realistically appraising nuclear weapons and their 
dangers demands the negotiation of a ban treaty. What is overly idealistic is to believe 
that humanity, if it possesses nuclear weapons indefinitely, will indefinitely manage 
to avoid nuclear war. 
This brings me around to the concept of deterrence, which my roundtable colleagues 
Joelien Pretorius and Polina Sinovets have debated. My own view is that the Cold 
War may have represented a golden age for deterrence—and that age is now over. 
The Cold War world was organized around two superpowers that each possessed 
tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, ready for use at any time. The weapons could 
be delivered using air-based, land-based, and sea-based platforms. Both sides were 
confident in the other’s ability to launch a second strike; this confidence deterred a 
first strike. 
But the world has grown more complicated. It isn’t organized anymore into stable 
blocs around two superpowers—rather, power has become more diffuse and nuclear 
weapons have spread. In nuclear South Asia, relations between India and Pakistan 
are worryingly unstable. In North Korea, Kim Jong Un himself may be worryingly 
unstable. 
Today’s leadership profiles in the United States and Russia are arguably no better. 
Donald Trump’s control of the US nuclear arsenal has rattled expert observers ever 
since he emerged as a serious contender for the presidency. Vladimir Putin behaves 
with increasing aggression, virtually daring the West to put its foot down. 
Realist thinkers have traditionally portrayed individuals in charge of nuclear 
weapons as rational actors, capable of performing accurate cost-benefit analyses and 
responding sensibly to the reality that potential adversaries possess nuclear weapons 
too. Some realist scholars have argued that the world would achieve greater strategic 
stability if more states possessed nuclear weapons. But even realists ought to realize 
that most leaders controlling nuclear weapons today can’t necessarily be trusted to 
behave rationally. 
A characteristic of nuclear weapons that distinguishes them from all other weapons 
is that the destruction they cause is irreversible. After nuclear war, no program of 
reconstruction could ameliorate nuclear winter. No human effort could remove 
enormous amounts of poisonous radiation from the environment. Is it unrealistic, 
then, to be alarmed about the current leadership in the major nuclear weapon states? 
Even realists ought to admit that it is not. 
So is it realistic to wait passively for disarmament while the power to launch nuclear-
tipped missiles rests with leaders whose rationality is in question? Or is it realistic to 
work toward disarmament, including through a ban treaty, so that no irrational leader 
can ever initiate a nuclear war? 
Oh, don’t forget—once your leader presses the button, it will be too late to say 
“Oops.” 
